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Abstract
This paper presents a futures mechanism, as defined by Kurino (2009), allocating
a set of indivisible and durable goods among a set of agents over multiple time
periods. The mechanism is shown to satisfy individual rationality, Pareto efficiency
and non-bossiness for allocation problems with or without endowments. The paper
also shows that the mechanism does not satisfy strategy-proofness and presents the
conditions under which the mechanism is manipulable.
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1 Introduction
Consider two siblings, Yngve and Ingvor. Yngve and Ingvor are playing in their backyard.
In the backyard, there is a short skipping rope and a small trampoline. Only one person
may use the skipping rope or the trampoline at a time and no one may use the skipping
rope while jumping on the trampoline. Dinner is ready in 20 minutes. If Yngve and
Ingvor divide these 20 minutes into two 10 minute periods, they have a number of different
alternatives to consider. Yngve could, for example, jump on the trampoline in both periods,
while Ingvor spends 20 minutes skipping. Another option would be for Yngve to spend
the first period jumping on the trampoline and the second period skipping, while Ingvor
is skipping in the first period and jumping on the trampoline in the second period. Yngve
and Ingvor cannot agree on what to do, so they ask their mother to decide for them. Which
of the many alternatives should she choose, and why? Solutions to this kind of problem
are studied in a field known as mechanism design.
The above is an example of the problem of how to allocate a number of goods, such
as skipping ropes and trampolines, among a group of agents, such as Yngve and Ingvor.
Allocation problems of this kind have been studied extensively and have many different
applications, ranging from school choice and housing to kidney exchange programs. A
mechanism designer, represented by Yngve’s and Ingvor’s mother in the example above, is
interested in solving allocation problems and does so by selecting a mechanism. A matching
mechanism is a rule that, given its inputs, selects a matching between agents and goods.
For allocation problems with indivisible goods, the mechanism selects a matching such
that each good is assigned to at most one agent. Whenever there is more than one time
period, such as in the example above, the mechanism must select one matching for each
period. Such a sequence of matchings is referred to as a matching plan. For instance, a
mechanism could select a matching plan, under which Yngve is assigned the skipping rope
in period one and the trampoline in period two, while Ingvor is assigned the trampoline
in period one and the skipping rope in period two. Imagine that Yngve has called dibs
on the trampoline. Yngve is then already assigned the trampoline when their mother is
making her decision. Whenever some goods start out assigned to agents, the allocation
problem is known as an allocation problem with endowments. This paper will limit its focus
to a class of mechanisms known as direct mechanisms. Under this framework, the agents
are of different types and each agent is asked to reveal his or her type. The mechanism
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makes use of this information when selecting matchings or matching plans between agents
and goods. Suppose that Yngve is the type that likes to climb trees, while Ingvor is of a
more down-to-earth type. Their mother, who does not know as much about her children
as she probably should, will ask Yngve and Ingvor to reveal their types. She will then
use their responses to select a matching plan under which, for example, Yngve jumps on
the trampoline in both periods and Ingvor is skipping in both periods. An agent’s type
is often synonymous with his or her preferences over the different goods. If this were the
case, Yngve and Ingvor would simply be asked if they prefer skipping to jumping on the
trampoline or vice versa.
Mechanisms are normally evaluated by examining which properties they satisfy. A
mechanism is individually rational if no agent is ever made worse off by the mechanism.
For example, suppose that Yngve has called dibs on the trampoline, because he really likes
to jump on the trampoline. He would then be made worse off if his mother chose not to
respect his dibs and let Ingvor jump on the trampoline in both periods. A matching or
matching plan is Pareto efficient if no agent can be made better off without making some
other agent worse off and a mechanism is Pareto efficient if it always selects Pareto efficient
matchings or matching plans. Suppose that Yngve wants to jump on the trampoline and
that Ingvor prefers skipping. If their mother decides that Yngve will be skipping in both
periods and Ingvor will be jumping on the trampoline in both periods, this clearly does not
represent a Pareto efficient matching plan. Both Yngve and Ingvor would be made better
off if she changed her mind and decided that Yngve should be jumping on the trampoline
in both periods and Ingvor should be skipping in both periods. However, if both Yngve and
Ingvor hate skipping ropes and only want to jump on the trampoline, then anything their
mother decides will represent a Pareto efficient matching plan. A mechanism is non-bossy
if it is impossible for any agent to affect any other agent’s assignment without affecting his
or her own assignment as well. Assume that there are two skipping ropes, one red and one
blue skipping rope. Further assume that Yngve has reported his true type to his mother
and that he was assigned the trampoline in both periods, while Ingvor was assigned the
blue skipping rope in both periods. The mechanism is non-bossy if there is nothing Yngve
could have reported to his mother that would have made her decide to assign Yngve the
trampoline in both periods and Ingvor the red skipping rope in any of the two periods.
A mechanism is strategy-proof if no agent can benefit from reporting a type that is not
his or her true type. In the framework employed in this paper, this is equivalent to no
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agent being able to benefit by misrepresenting his or her preferences. For example, suppose
Yngve knows that his mother is so mean that she will always choose the activity he likes
the least for him. Yngve could then benefit by lying about his preference for trampoline
jumping and report that he prefers playing with the skipping rope.
Most of the literature focuses on allocation problems where all reallocations take place
at a single point in time. Some authors have introduced time in their models, studying
intertemporal allocation problems such as the one faced by Yngve’s and Ingvor’s mother.
Time is typically discrete, consisting of a finite number of periods. Kurino (2009) defines
two classes of mechanisms solving intertemporal allocation problems. A spot mechanism is
a one-period mechanism that is repeated in each time period. In each period, agents report
their preferences over the goods in the economy and the mechanism selects a matching
between agents and goods for this period. A futures mechanism is a mechanism where
agents report their preferences over the entire time interval during which they participate
in the economy. The futures mechanism uses this information to select a matching plan,
under which each agent is assigned one good for each time period in which he or she
participates in the economy.
While deciding who will jump on the trampoline and who will use the skipping rope
might seem like a trivial problem, there are several important real world applications
that motivate the study of intertemporal allocation problems. Consider, for example, a
company in charge of providing housing for students at a university. Suppose that there
are three types of student housing: dorm rooms, small apartments and large apartments;
and that each student stays at the university for three years. Assuming that the company
is interested in finding an allocation of rooms and apartments that the students are happy
with, it will not want to force students to live in the same room or apartment for three
years. One solution would be to divide the three years into three periods and match each
student with a room or apartment each year. The easiest way to accomplish this would
be to repeat a one-period mechanism once a year. That way, each student would have
the option to change his or her preferences and possibly be assigned a different room or
apartment in the second or third year. Suppose, however, that students know before the
start of the first year how their preferences for different types of housing will change over
the course of the three years. Perhaps some students know that they want to live in a dorm
room the first year to meet new people and that they will want their own apartment in the
second and third years. Other students might have families and children and require large
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apartments for the full duration of their studies. The company could then implement a
futures mechanism to take such preferences into account. The students would report their
preferences over sequences of rooms and apartments of the form (dorm room in year 1,
small apartment in year 2, large apartment in year 3) or (small apartment in year 1, small
apartment in year 2, dorm room in year 3). The company would finally use these reports
to assign such a sequence of rooms and apartments to each student.
1.1 Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to present a futures mechanism that solves intertemporal allo-
cation problems with endowments. Furthermore, the purpose is to prove that this mecha-
nism satisfies Pareto efficiency, individual rationality and non-bossiness, and to prove that
it does not satisfy strategy-proofness as well as under which conditions it is manipulable.
1.2 Related literature
This paper is related to the literature on intertemporal allocation problems with indivisible
goods. One of the earliest papers dealing with a single-period matching problem is Gale
and Shapley’s (1962) paper on college admissions and the stability of marriage. The use of
trading cycles in section 3 is heavily influenced by the paper by Shapley and Scarf (1974)
introducing the concept of top trading cycles, as well as the top trading cycles mecha-
nism for single-period house allocation problems in Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez (1999).
The mechanism described in section 3.2 differs from the mechanism introduced by Ab-
dulkadiroglu and So¨nmez in the sense that it selects trading cycles, but not necessarily
top trading cycles. Furthermore, the mechanism in section 3.2 assumes that their pref-
erences in subsequent periods are known by the agents in the first period, in contrast to
Abdulkadiroglu and Loertzscher (2007) who study a two-period allocation problem where
the agents’ types in the second period are unknown. Kurino (2009, 2013) and Bloch and
Cantala (2011) study a multi-period house allocation problem in which agents enter and
exit the model over time, as opposed to the fixed set of agents assumed in this paper.
U¨nver (2009) considers a dynamic kidney allocation problem where time is introduced as
a factor and Dur (2011) considers a dynamic two-period school choice problem, where it
is considered preferable to assign siblings to the same schools. Zou, Gujar and Parkes
(2010) examine a dynamic intertemporal allocation problem, where agents are ranked in
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accordance with their point of arrival. In this setting, they examine the efficiency gains of
adopting manipulable mechanisms whenever a sufficiently large share of the agents fail to
act strategically and instead report their preferences truthfully.
All of the papers mentioned above that deal with intertemporal allocation problems
present some type of spot mechanism. One of the benefits of considering futures mech-
anisms, such as the futures mechanism presented in section 3.2, is their ability to take
more advanced preferences into account. If a spot mechanism is used, the mechanism de-
signer only has access to agents’ preferences over objects in the present period. If a futures
mechanism is used, the mechanism designer has access to agents’ preferences over several
periods. As shown in section 3.1, such information could be used to find better matching
plans.
1.3 Overview
Section 2 presents the sets and definitions used throughout the paper. Section 3 begins by
motivating the study of futures mechanisms. It then goes on to define and describe the
mechanism. Finally, an algorithm that finds the matching plan selected by the mechanism
is presented. Section 4 shows that the mechanism satisfies individual rationality, Pareto
efficiency and non-bossiness. Furthermore, it shows that the mechanism does not satisfy
strategy-proofness and presents the conditions under which an agent may benefit from
misrepresenting his or her preferences. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The model: Sets and definitions
2.1 Agents and objects
Time consists of an interval of T discrete periods t ∈ [1, T ] ⊂ N. There are N t agents
it ∈ I t ⊆ I , where I t is the set of agents existing in period t ∈ [1, T ] and I is the agent
space. An agent may exist in several periods. Define the set of agents existing in any period
t ∈ [1, T ] as I = {i | it ∈ I t for some t ∈ [1, T ]}. Agent it should be interpreted as the
period t representation of agent i, such that it ∈ I t ⇐⇒ i ∈ I t. There are M t indivisible
and durable goods at ∈ At ⊆ A called objects, where At is the set of objects existing in
period t ∈ [1, T ] and A is the object space. The durability of objects indicates that objects
may exist in several periods and the indivisibility of objects indicates that an object may
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be consumed by at most one agent in each period. Define the set of objects existing in
any period t ∈ [1, T ] as A = {a | at ∈ At for some t ∈ [1, T ]}. As with agents, at should
be interpreted as the period t representation of a, such that at ∈ At ⇐⇒ a ∈ At. An
economy is defined as a three-tuple 〈T, I, A〉 ∈ N ×I × A . In this paper, it is assumed
that for all t, t′ ∈ [1, T ], I t = I t′ = I and At = At′ = A, and by implication, N t = N t′ = N
and M t = M t
′
= M . In other words, no agents enter or exit the model and there is no
production or destruction of objects. In addition, denote the null object by a0. The null
object is interpreted as ”no object.” A sequence of T objects a ∈ A ∪ a0 consisting of one
object in each period t ∈ [1, T ] is called a consumption path, defined by the ordered set
x ≡ {x(t) | ∀t ∈ [1, T ] x(t) ∈ At ∪ a0}. The consumption path space X is defined by
X ≡∏Tt=1{At ∪ a0}, where ∏ denotes the Cartesian product. Throughout this paper J(j)
will denote the j’th element in J whenever J is an ordered set.
2.2 Matching plans and assignments
A matching plan is an injective function µ: I → X. It could also be written as µ = {µt |
t ∈ [1, T ]}, where the period t matching, µt, is an injective function µt: I t → At ∪ a0. In
other words, a matching plan maps each agent i ∈ I to some object a ∈ A ∪ a0 in each
period, together constituting a consumption path x ∈ X. The consumption path agent i
is mapped to is referred to as agent i’s assignment and the object agent i is mapped to in
period t is referred to as agent i’s period t assignment. The matching plan space is denoted
by M . The indivisibility of objects implies that an object at ∈ At may be assigned to
at most one agent it ∈ I t, or equivalently that an object a ∈ A may be assigned to at
most one agent i ∈ I in each period t ∈ [1, T ]. The null object may, however, be assigned
to any number of agents in each period. The assignment of agent i under µ is denoted
by µ(i) and the period t assignment of i is denoted by µt(i). The sets of assignments of
some I ′ ⊆ I and I ′t ⊆ I t are denoted by µ(I ′) and µt(I ′t) respectively. Even though a
period t matching is not a bijective function and technically not invertible, for notational
ease, the agent assigned object a in period t under µ will be referred to as µ−1t (a). The
endowment of agent i is denoted by λ(i) ∈ X and the endowments of I ′ ⊆ I are denoted
by λ(I ′), where λ ∈M is the original matching plan before any reassignments have been
made. λ(i) always contains the same object a ∈ A ∪ a0 in all periods. This means that
∀t, t′ ∈ [1, T ] λt(i) = a ⇐⇒ λt′(i) = a. Let AtA ⊆ At denote the set of objects assigned
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to some agent i ∈ I t and let AtU ⊆ At denote the set of objects unassigned to any agent in
period t. By construction, AtA ∩ AtU = ∅.
2.3 Preferences
Each agent i ∈ I has a complete and transitive strict preference relation Pi ∈ Ω onX, where
Ω is the preference domain. In other words, Pi is an ordered set containing all elements in
X. xRix
′ means that x is weakly preferred to x′ and xPix′ means that x is strictly preferred
to x′. A consumption path x ∈ X is said to be acceptable to i if and only if xRiλ(i). Note
that as Pi ∈ Ω is a strict preference relation, xRix′∧¬(xPix′) ⇐⇒ x = x′. Ω is restricted
such that, everything else equal, all agents prefer being assigned some at ∈ At to being
assigned a0 in any period. A preference profile is defined by P = {Pi | i ∈ I} ∈
∏N
i=1 Ω. If
µ, µ′ ∈M , then µPiµ′ ⇐⇒ µ(i)Piµ′(i).
2.4 Allocation problems and mechanisms
An allocation problem is defined as a five-tuple 〈T, I, A, P, λ〉 ∈ N×I ×A ×∏Ni=1 Ω×M .
If ∀i ∈ I,∀t ∈ [1, T ] λt(i) = a0, it is called an allocation problem without endowments.
Otherwise, it is called an allocation problem with endowments. If T ≥ 2, it is called
an intertemporal allocation problem. There is a mechanism designer who is interested in
finding a solution to some allocation problem. The mechanism designer creates or inherits
a ranking of all agents and agents are allowed to send some message to the mechanism
designer, typically communicating their preferences for different objects or consumption
paths. This information is used to select a solution to the allocation problem, in the form
of a matching plan µ ∈M .
The ranking of the agents is an externally determined strict priority structure given
by the bijective function f : ([1, N ] ⊂ N) → I. However, for notational ease, the priority
structure f will be treated as an ordered subset of I, such that f(1) denotes the agent of
highest priority and f(#f) denotes the agent of lowest priority. The # sign denotes the
number of elements in the set it precedes. If i, i′ ∈ f , then ifi′ is interpreted as i being
of higher priority than i′ under f . Let F denote the priority structure space, given some
I ∈ I . Priority structures can be determined in a number of different ways. For example,
the priority structure could reflect the preferences of the owner of the objects, it could
reflect the time an agent has been waiting for an object or it could simply be randomized.
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A strategy of agent i, which can be thought of as a message sent by agent i to the
mechanism designer, is denoted by Si ∈ Si, where Si is agent i’s strategy space. A strategy
profile S is defined by S ≡ {Si | i ∈ I}. If I ′ ⊆ I, then SI′ ≡ {Si | i ∈ I ′}. In this
multi-period model, a matching mechanism consists of a strategy space Si for each i ∈ I
and an injective function Γ:
∏N
i=1Si × F →M that selects some matching plan µ ∈M
for each combination of strategy profiles and priority structures (S, f) ∈ ∏Ni=1Si × F .
This is an adaptation of the definition used by Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez (1999) to
intertemporal allocation problems. A direct matching mechanism is a matching mechanism
where ∀i ∈ I Si = Ω. As preference relations Pi ∈ Ω are ordered sets, element j in Si can
be denoted by Si(j) and the element in Si(j) corresponding to period t can be denoted by
Sti (j) whenever the mechanism is a direct mechanism. All mechanisms discussed in this
paper are direct matching mechanisms. A matching mechanism consisting of the strategy
space Ω and a function Γ will simply be referred to as the Γ mechanism. If Γ(S, f) = µ,
then Γi(S, f) = µ(i).
3 Mechanism design
3.1 Classes of mechanisms
Matching mechanisms are most commonly studied in a static one-period (T = 1) frame-
work. In this framework, X = A and the preferences are defined over A. The mechanism
thus selects a single period 1 matching µ1, rather than a matching plan µ. For intertemporal
allocation problems, Kurino (2009) defines two classes of mechanisms. A spot mechanism
is a mechanism that selects a matching plan by repeating a one-period mechanism in each
period. Spot mechanisms are appealing since static one-period mechanisms can easily be
converted to spot mechanisms for intertemporal allocation problems. A futures mechanism
is a mechanism where agents are asked to report their preferences over the entire period
during which they participate in the economy. A spot mechanism is less demanding of
the agents as they are only asked to report their preferences over objects in A, whereas a
futures mechanism requires agents to report preferences over X, a significantly larger set
whenever T ≥ 2. At the same time, a futures mechanism can take more advanced pref-
erences into account. To understand the difference, consider a simple mechanism known
as serial dictatorship (SD) that will select the same matching plan if implemented as a
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spot mechanism (SDS) as it would if implemented as a futures mechanism (SDF ). In the
one-period case, SD assigns the agent of highest priority his most preferred object in A1
and removes that object from A1. The agent of second highest priority is then assigned his
most preferred object out of those remaining in A1, and so on until all objects have been
assigned to some agent or all agents have been assigned some object. SD has been proven
to be strategy-proof and Pareto efficient (Svensson, 1994). Although it will not be proven
in this paper, the arguments hold for SDS and SDF as well. When implemented as a spot
mechanism, the process is simply repeated for A2, A3, . . . , AT . When implemented as a
futures mechanism, the agent of highest priority is assigned his most preferred consumption
path x ∈ X and all consumption paths involving some at ∈ x are removed from X. The
agent of second highest priority is then assigned his most preferred consumption path out
of those remaining in X, and so on until all agents have been assigned some consumption
path. If T = 3 and (a1, a2, a1) ∈ X is agent f(1)’s most preferred consumption path, this
simply corresponds to f(1) preferring object a1 to all other objects in A
1, a2 to all other
objects in A2 and a1 to all other objects in A
3. If these preferences are reported, SDS
would assign f(1) the consumption path (a1, a2, a1). The reader can confirm that all other
agents in I would be assigned the same consumption paths under both SDS and SDF as
well. The reason why SDS and SDF select the same matching plan is that there are no
property rights in the serial dictatorship mechanism. To see this, consider a well known
extension of SD known as serial dictatorship with waiting list, (SDWL) which introduces
property rights. SDWL assigns objects to agents in the same way as SD, with the differ-
ence that agents can only be assigned objects that are not already assigned to some other
agent. Whenever an agent is assigned a new object, his previous assignment becomes unas-
signed. SDWL thus ensures the right of each agent to keep his or her current assignment
until some more preferred object is available. The serial dictatorship with waiting list spot
mechanism (SDSWL) is simply SDWL repeated in each period. The serial dictatorship with
waiting list futures mechanism (SDFWL) assigns f(1) his or her most preferred consumption
path x ∈ X such that x(t)Pf(1)λt(f(1)) for all t ∈ [1, T ] and such that each at ∈ x is either
λt(f(1)) or unassigned. All a
t ∈ x are assigned to f(1) and all at for which at ∈ λ(f(1))
and at /∈ x become unassigned. The same step is then repeated in order for f(2) through
f(#f). SDSWL and SD
F
WL do not necessarily select the same matching plans. To see this,
consider an allocation problem with endowments 〈T, I, A, P, λ〉, where T = 3, I = {i1, i2},
AA = {a1, a2}, AU = {a3}, λ(i1) = a1, λ(i2) = a2 and P is given by
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P1 P2
(a1, a3, a1) (a2, a1, a1)
(a1, a1, a1) (a2, a1, a2)
. . . (a2, a2, a2)
. . .
Furthermore, let f = (i1, i2). Under SD
F
WL, i1 is guaranteed (a1, a1, a1), but is assigned
(a1, a3, a1), which is strictly preferred to (a1, a1, a1). This results in a1 ∈ A2 being unas-
signed. Next, i2 is guaranteed (a2, a2, a2), but can be assigned (a2, a1, a2), which is strictly
preferred to (a2, a2, a2), as a1 ∈ A2 is now unassigned. This matching plan is, however, not
necessarily selected by SDSWL. In period 1, i1 and i2 are both assigned their endowments.
In period 2, i1 is guaranteed a1, but would prefer to be assigned a3. Suppose i1 reports
that a3 ∈ A2 is preferred to a1 ∈ A2, then a1 ∈ A2 would become unassigned. As agent i2
prefers to be assigned a1 to a2 and a3 in both period 2 and period 3, i2 would finally be
assigned his or her most preferred consumption path (a2, a1, a1). Agent i1, on the other
hand, would be assigned either (a1, a3, a2) or (a1, a3, a3), to both of which agent i1 prefers
(a1, a1, a1). In this example, i2 gained from i1’s inability to predict i2’s period 3 preferences
correctly. Such uncertainties regarding the future preferences of other agents might induce
agents to report preferences that make all agents worse off. Consider the same allocation
problem as above, with a new preference profile P ′, given by
P ′1 P
′
2
(a1, a3, a1) (a2, a1, a2)
(a1, a1, a1) (a2, a2, a2)
. . . . . .
SDFWL would assign (a1, a3, a1) to i1, and (a2, a1, a2) to i2. SD
S
WL would also assign a1
to i1 and a2 to i2 in period 1. However, as i1 has no information on i2’s period 3 preferences,
i1 might choose to hold on to a1 out of fear of not being able to get it back in period 3.
As a result, i1 is assigned (a1, a1, a1) and i2 is assigned (a2, a2, a2). In this scenario, SD
F
WL
selected a Pareto efficient matching plan, while SDSWL did not. Since there was no risk of
not being assigned a1 in period 3, i1 had no incentive not to choose to be assigned a3 in
period 2. This made a1 available in period 2, making i2’s most preferred consumption path
attainable to i2 as well. The above example showed a situation in which the SD
F
WL selected
a matching plan preferred by all agents to the matching plan selected by SDSWL. Under
SDFWL, both the mechanism designer and the agents have access to more information on
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assignments in subsequent periods than they do under SDSWL. This information may, as
demonstrated, be used to find better matchings between agents and objects. Such potential
benefits motivate the study of futures mechanisms even when spot mechanisms are easier
to implement. It is easy to see that SDF is not individually rational whenever there are
endowments. Furthermore, SDFWL is only Pareto efficient for allocation problems without
endowments, in which case it reduces to SDF . That SDFWL is not Pareto efficient is easily
confirmed by considering an allocation problem with endowments, where AtU = ∅ for each
t ∈ [1, T ] and λ(i) is the least preferred consumption path for all agents i ∈ I. The ϕ
mechanism described in section 3.2 is a futures mechanism that satisfies both individual
rationality and Pareto efficiency for allocation problems with endowments.
3.2 The ϕ mechanism
To describe the ϕ mechanism, some additional concepts are needed. A trading cycle, or
simply a cycle, ct, is an ordered set (j1, j2, . . . , jk) of agents and objects j ∈ I t ∪At, where
j1 → j2, j2 → j3, . . . , jk−1 → jk and jk → j1 and “→” is read as “points to”. Further define
“→” such that i → x ⇐⇒ ∀a ∈ x i → a and x → i ⇐⇒ x(1) → i. Which at ∈ At or
x ∈ X each i ∈ I points to is determined by Pi ∈ Ω and which i ∈ I each at ∈ At points
to is determined by some f ∈ F in a manner described in section 3.3. Given some f ∈ F ,
a cycle ct is defined exclusively by which a ∈ At each i ∈ ct points to. A cycle is permitted
to involve only one agent and one object. In the algorithm in section 3.3, |ct| will be used
to denote the number of cycles that have formed in period t at the step in consideration.
Let a cycle set be defined as
C = {ct | i ∈ ct ∈ C =⇒ ∀t′ ∈ [1, T ] (∃ct′ ∈ C: i ∈ ct′)}. (1)
In other words, C is a nested set of cycles, where any agent participating in any cycle
in C also participates in some cycle in C in each period t ∈ [1, T ]. As each agent i ∈ I
participating in C points to some at ∈ At in each period t, each agent participating in
C also points to at least one consumption path x ∈ X in C. For notational ease, denote
i ∈ ct ∈ C by i ∈ C and a ∈ ct ∈ C by a ∈ C. Furthermore, if i → x in C, then x ∈ C.
Define C as the set of all C for which
∀t ∈ [1, T ],∀at ∈ At (at ∈ x ∈ C =⇒ @x′ ∈ C: at ∈ x′), (2)
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∀t ∈ [1, T ],∀i ∈ I (i ∈ ct ∈ C =⇒ @(c′t 6= ct) ∈ C: i ∈ c′t) (3)
and
C ∈ C =⇒ @C ′ ∈ C : C ′ ⊂ C. (4)
The first condition ensures that the constraint that all at ∈ At be indivisible is satisfied
and that no i ∈ I may point to more than one a ∈ A in any period. The second condition
ensures that each agent participating in C will participate in exactly one ct ∈ C in each
period and point to exactly one consumption path x ∈ X. The third condition ensures
that a cycle set cannot be divided into smaller cycle sets. A set
Cµ ≡ {{C ∈ C } | (∀i ∈ I ∃j: (i ∈ Cj ∈ Cµ ∧ i /∈ C¬j ∈ Cµ)) ∧
(at ∈ x ∈ Cj ∈ Cµ =⇒ at /∈ x′ ∈ C¬j ∈ Cµ)} (5)
defines a matching plan µ ∈M , under which each agent is assigned the consumption path
he or she is pointing to in Cµ. The first condition states that an agent may only participate
in one C ∈ Cµ and the second condition states that an object may only participate in one
cycle set in each period. Not all matching plans can be defined by such a set. The ϕ
mechanism always selects a matching plan µ by selecting some Cµ.
Let IC denote the ordered set of all agents participating in C. IC is ordered analogously
with g1 in section 3.3. IC(1) is the agent participating in C that is of highest priority under
f and IC(k ≥ 2) is the agent whose endowment agent IC(k − 1) points to in period 1.
Denote the set of all cycle sets C ∈ C in which each participating agent i ∈ I points to an
acceptable consumption path by CIR ⊆ C . In other words, CIR is the set of all C ∈ C that
satisfy the individual rationality constraint. A cycle set C ∈ C is preferred by an agent to
a cycle set C ′ ∈ C if and only if the agent prefers the consumption path he or she points
to in C to the one he or she points to in C ′. The agent is indifferent between them if he or
she points to the same consumption path in both. The ϕ mechanism selects a matching
plan by finding a set of cycle sets
{C ∈ Cµ | ∀C ∈ Cµ C ∈ CIR}. (6)
By the definition of Cµ, each agent i ∈ I participates in exactly one cycle set in (6). There
may be several sets matching the description of (6). To illustrate how the ϕ mechanism
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selects a particular set, define Ki as the set containing all C ∈ CIR involving agent i
and KJ as the set containing all C ∈ CIR involving any agent or object j ∈ J ⊆ I ∪
{at ∈ At | t ∈ [1, T ]}. Whenever ∀C ∈ Ki,∀i, i′ ∈ C ifi′, Ki is ordered such that
C ∈ Ki is of higher order than C ′ ∈ Ki if CPIC(1)C ′, or CRIC(1)C ′ ∧ CPIC(2)C ′, or
CRIC(1)C
′ ∧ CRIC(2)C ′ ∧ CPIC(3)C ′ and so on. Generally, C ∈ Ki is of higher order
than C ′ ∈ Ki if and only if
CPIC(1)C
′ ∨ (∃j: (CPIC(j)C ′ ∧ ∀j′ < j CRIC(j′)C ′)). (7)
In other words, C ∈ Ki is of higher order than C ′ ∈ Ki if C is strictly preferred to C ′ by
some agent i ∈ IC and all agents of higher order than i in IC are indifferent between C and
C ′. To see that R is equivalent to indifference in statement (7), consider some j for which
(7) holds and for which there exists some j′ < j such that CPIC(j′)C
′, then statement (7)
holds for j′ as well. As all agents in IC who are indifferent between C and C ′ necessarily
participate in C ′ as well, the definition is equivalent if IC is replaced by IC′ . Ki \KJ is the
ordered subset of Ki containing all cycles involving i but not involving any agent or object
j ∈ J ⊆ I ∪ {at ∈ At | t ∈ [1, T ]}. Lastly, define the set of all blocked i ∈ I and at ∈ At as
Bj ≡ {b ∈ I ∪ {at ∈ At | t ∈ [1, T ]} | b ∈ Bj−1 ∪ {Kj \KBj−1}(1)}, (8)
where B0 = ∅. B1 is thus the set of agents i ∈ I and objects at ∈ At participating in K1(1).
Definition 1. Given some (P, f) ∈ ∏Ni=1 Ω× F , the ϕ mechanism is the mechanism that
selects µ ∈MIR such that
Cµ = {Kj ∈ {{Kj \KBj−1}(1) |
(i1 ≡ f(1)) ∧ (ij≥2 ≡ (i ∈ I: ∀(i′ 6= i) /∈ Bj−1 ifi′) ∧ (∀(i′ 6= i) ∈ Bj−1 i′fi))}
| ∀i ∈ I ∃j: i ∈ Kj}. (9)
An algorithm that finds this matching plan is described in Section 3.3. To get an
intuitive understanding of Definition 1, it can be thought of as a process in which f(1) first
chooses the set of all C ∈ CIR that are weakly preferred to all other C ′ ∈ CIR. In all such
C, f(1) points to his most preferred consumption path out of all consumption paths he
points to in any C ∈ CIR. As a result, for any such cycle sets C and C ′, IC(2) = IC′(2).
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Agent IC(2), where C is an arbitrary element in agent f(1)’s choice, then chooses the
subset of agent f(1)’s choice containing all cycle sets that are weakly preferred by IC(2)
to all other cycle sets in f(1)’s choice. Next, agent IC(3), where C is an arbitrary element
in agent IC(2)’s choice, chooses the subset of agent IC(2)’s choice that consists of all cycle
sets that are weakly preferred by IC(3) to all other cycle sets in agent IC(2)’s choice. This
process continues until only Kf(1)(1) remains, at which point the process starts over with
the highest agent not participating in Kf(1)(1), i2, in place of f(1). At this point, i2 is
restricted to all C ∈ CIR that do not involve any agent or object j ∈ I∪{at ∈ At | t ∈ [1, T ]}
participating in Kf(1)(1). When, again, only one cycle set remains, the process starts over
with agent i3. i3 is defined as the agent not participating in any of the two selected cycle
sets above that is of highest priority under f , and is restricted to all C ∈ CIR that do not
involve any of the agents or objects j ∈ I ∪ {at ∈ At | t ∈ [1, T ]} participating in any of
the two selected cycle sets. The whole process terminates whenever ∀i ∈ I ∃j: i ∈ Cj. At
this point, the selected cycle sets form Cµ, and the ϕ mechanism selects the matching plan
µ. For allocation problems without endowments, the ϕ mechanism reduces to the serial
dictatorship futures mechanism described in Section 3.1.
3.3 The algorithm
In order to describe the algorithm that locates the matching plan selected by the ϕ
mechanism, some further notation is needed. gt is an ordered subset of I t, where gt(j)
denotes the jth agent in gt. At the start of the process, g1 = (f(1)). The set gt
can be partitioned into subsets gtj, where g
t is ordered by subset index first, such that
(gt1(1), g
t
1(2), . . . , g
t
1(#g
t
1), g
t
2(1), g
t
2(2), . . . ). Let lowercase sg(j) denote the ordered subset
of Sgt(j) consisting of acceptable consumption paths that are not blocked by any agent
gt(j) for whom j′ < j and that are not members of the set SBi . At the start of the
algorithm, ∀i ∈ I SBi = ∅. Let ν be a temporary matching, such that νt(i) is an ob-
ject at ∈ At temporarily assigned to agent i at some step of the algorithm. An agent
points to some x ∈ X. Through x, the agent points to each object in it, in its re-
spective period. If T = 2, si(1) = (a, a
′) and i → si(1), then this is equivalent to
((i1 ∈ I1) → (a1 ∈ A1)) ∧ ((i2 ∈ I2) → (a′2 ∈ A2)). Each (at ∈ AtA) → ν−1t (at),
each (at ∈ AtU) → gt|ct|+1(1) and a0 → I, i.e. a0 points at all agents in all periods. Before
the algorithm starts, µ is an empty matching, where no agent is assigned any consumption
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path. The algorithm starts at step 0.
Step 0
Clear gt for all t ≥ 1. Generate g11 = (f(1)) and set ν1 = λ1(f). Go to step 1.
Step 1
If
s1g1|c1|+1(1)
(1) = λ1(g
1
|c1|+1(1)), (10)
then go to step 1.1.2.a.
If
s1g1|c1|+1(1)
(1) ∈ A1U , (11)
then go to step 1.1.2.b.
Otherwise go to step 1.1.
Step 1.1
g1(#g1)→ sg1(#g1)(1)→ ν−11 (s1g1(#g1)(1)). Place ν−11 (s1g1(#g1)(1)) at the bottom of g1.
If
sg1(#g1)(1) = λ(g
1(#g1)), (12)
then go to step 1.1.1.
If
sg1(#g1)(1) 6= λ(g1(#g1)) ∧ s1g1(#g1)(1) /∈ ν1(g1|c1|+1(1)) ∪ A1U , (13)
then go to step 1.1.
If
sg1(#g1)(1) 6= λ(g1(#g1)) ∧ s1g1(#g1)(1) = ν1(g1|c1|+1(1)), (14)
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then go to step 1.1.2.a.
If
sg1(#g1)(1) 6= λ(g1(#g1)) ∧ s1g1(#g1)(1) ∈ A1U , (15)
then go to step 1.1.2.b.
Step 1.1.1
Sort sg1(#g1−1)(1) into SBg1(#g1−1), clear S
B
g1(#g1) and remove g
1(#g1) from g1. Go to step 1.
Step 1.1.2.a
A cycle c1|c1|+1 is formed. Modify ν1 such that all agents in g
1 are assigned the objects
they point to and generate g21 = (g
1(1)). Modify ν2 such that for all i ∈ f , ν2(i) = ν1(i) if
ν1(i) ∈ A2 and ν2(i) = a0 otherwise. Go to step 2.
Step 1.1.2.b
A cycle c1|c1|+1 is formed. Modify ν1 such that all agents in g
1 are assigned the objects they
point to and such that ν1(g
1
|c1|(1)) ∈ A1U if ν1(g1|c1|(1)) 6= a0. Generate g21 = (g1(1)) and
modify ν2 such that for all i ∈ f , ν2(i) = ν1(i) if ν1(i) ∈ A2 and ν2(i) = a0 otherwise. Go
to step 2.
Step t ≥ 2
If
stgt|ct|+1(1)
(1) = νt(g
t
|ct|+1(1)), (16)
then go to step t.1.4.a.
If
stgt|ct|+1(1)
(1) ∈ AtU , (17)
then go to step t.1.4.b.
Otherwise go to step t.1.
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Step t.1
gt(#gt)→ sgt(#gt)(1)→ ν−1t (stgt(#gt)(1)) and place ν−1t (stgt(#gt)(1)) at the bottom of gt.
If
gt(#gt) /∈ g1 ∧ sgt(#gt)(1) = λ(gt(#gt)), (18)
then go to step t.1.1.
If
gt(#gt) /∈ g1 ∧ sgt(#gt)(1) 6= λ(gt(#gt)), (19)
then go to step t.1.2.
If
gt(#gt) ∈ g1 ∧ sgt(#gt)(1) 6= λ(gt(#gt)) ∧ stgt(#gt)(1) /∈ νt(gt|ct|+1(1)) ∪ AtU , (20)
then go to step t.1.
If
gt(#gt) ∈ g1 ∧ sgt(#gt)(1) 6= λ(gt(#gt)) ∧ stgt(#gt)(1) = νt(gt|ct|+1(1)), (21)
then go to step t.1.4.a.
If
gt(#gt) ∈ g1 ∧ sgt(#gt)(1) 6= λ(gt(#gt)) ∧ stgt(#gt)(1) ∈ AtU , (22)
then go to step t.1.4.b.
Step t.1.1
Sort sgt(#gt−1)(1) into SBgt(#gt−1) and clear S
B
gt(#gt). Go to step 0.
Step t.1.2
Generate g1|c1|+1 = (g
t(#gt)). Go to step 1.
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Step t.1.4.a
A cycle ct|ct|+1 is formed. Modify νt such that all agents in g
t are assigned the objects they
point to. Go to step t.1.5.
Step t.1.4.b
A cycle ct|ct|+1 is formed. Modify νt such that all agents in g
t are assigned the objects they
point to and such that νt(g
t
|ct|(1)) ∈ AtU . Go to step t.1.5.
Step t.1.5
If
#gt < #g1, (23)
then go to step t.1.5.a.
If
#gt = #g1, (24)
then go to step t.1.5.b.
Step t.1.5.a
Generate gt|ct|+1 = ({g1 \ gt}(1)). Go to step t.
Step t.1.5.b
If
t < T, (25)
then modify νt+1 such that for all i ∈ f , νt+1(i) = νt(i) if νt(i) ∈ At+1 and νt+1(i) = a0
otherwise. Go to step t+ 1.
If
t = T, (26)
then go to step T.2.
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Step T.2
Modify µ such that all agents in g1 are assigned the consumption paths x ∈ X they
are pointing to. Remove all {at ∈ At | ∃i ∈ g1: i → at} from At and sort all strategies
involving at least one such at into SBi for all i ∈ f . Remove all i ∈ g1 from f . Go to step
0.
The process ends when all agents in I have been assigned some x ∈ X under µ. I.e.,
the process ends when µ ∈M .
3.4 Example
Consider an allocation problem 〈T, I, A, P, λ〉 where T = 2, I = {i1, i2, . . . , i6}, A1A = A2A =
{a1, a2, . . . , a5}, A1U = A2U = {a6}, λ(ij) = aj for j = 1, 2, . . . , 5, λ(i6) = a0 and P is given
by
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
(a4, a2) (a4, a4) (a4, a4) (a1, a6) (a5, a3) . . .
. . . (a1, a1) (a5, a5) . . . (a3, a5)
(a2, a1) (a5, a4) (a5, a5)
. . . . . . . . .
Furthermore, let f = (i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6).
Step 0
g11 = i1 is generated and ν1 is modified such that ν1 = λ1. Go to step 1.
Step 1
|c1| = 0 and sg1|c1|+1(1)(1) = s1(1) = (a4, a2). s
1
g1|c1|+1(1)
(1) = a4 6= λ1(i1) = a1 and a4 /∈ A1U .
Go to step 1.1.
Step 1.1
(g1(1) = a1) → (s11(1) = a4) → (ν−11 (a4) = i4). i4 is placed at the bottom of g1. Now
sg1(#g1)(1) = s4(1) = (a1, a3). ((a1, a3) 6= λ(i4)) ∧ (s14(1) = a1) = (ν1(g11(1)) = ν1(i1) =
a1). Go to step 1.1.2.a.
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Step 1.1.2.a
A cycle c11 is formed. ν1 is modified such that ν1(i1) = a4 and ν1(i4) = a1. ν2 is set such
that ν2 = ν1 and g
2
1 = (i1) is generated. Go to step 2.
Step 2
sg2|c2|+1(1)
(1) = s1(1) = (a4, a2). (s
2
1(1) = a2) 6= (ν2(g21(1)) = a4) and a2 /∈ AtU . Go to step
2.1.
Step 2.1
i1 → (a4, a2)→ (ν−12 (a2) = i2) and i2 is placed at the bottom of gt. Note that a14 and a11 are
pointed to by i1 and i4 respectively. Both (a4, a4) and (a1, a1) are thus blocked strategies
for agent i2, giving s2(1) = (a2, a1). As i2 /∈ g1 and s2(1) = (a2, a1) 6= λi2 , go to step 2.1.2.
Step 2.1.2
g12 = (i2) is generated. Go to step 1.
Step 1
s12(1) = a2 = λ1(i2). Go to step 1.1.2.a.
Step 1.1.2.a
A cycle c12 is formed, involving only i2 and a2. ν1 is modified such that ν1(i2) = a2. Then
ν2 is set such that ν2 = ν1 and g
2
1 = (i1) is generated, replacing the existing g
2
1. Go to step
2, which is repeated exactly as above.
Step 2.1
i1 → (a4, a2) → i2 and i2 is placed at the bottom of g2, just like before. However, now
i2 ∈ g1 holds, s2(1) 6= λ(i2) and s22(1) = a1 /∈ (ν2(i1) = a4) ∪ A2U . Go to step 2.1.
Step 2.1
i2 → (a2, a1) → i4 and i4 is placed at the bottom of g2. As i4 ∈ g1, s4(1) 6= λ(i4) and
s24(1) = a6 ∈ A2U , go to step 2.1.4.b.
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Step 2.1.4.b
A cycle c21 is formed. νt is modified such that ν2(i1) = a2, ν2(i2) = a1 and ν2(i4) = a6 and
such that a4 ∈ A2U . Go to step 2.1.5.
Step 2.1.5
#g2 = #g1 = 3. Go to step 2.1.5.b.
Step 2.1.5.b
T = 2. Go to step T.2.
Step T.2
µ(i1) = (a4, a2), µ(i2) = (a2, a1) and µ(i4) = (a1, a6). {a1, a2, a4} are removed from A1,
{a1, a2, a6} are removed from A2 and {i1, i2, i4} are removed from f . Go to step 0.
The reader can confirm that a cycle set C ∈ CIR has formed at step T.2. At this
point, A1A = A
2
A = {a3, a5}, A1U = {a6}, A2U = {a4} and f = (i3, i5, i6).
Step 0
Both g1 and g2 are cleared. g11 = (i3) is generated and ν1 is modified such that ν1 = λ1(f).
This implies that ν1(i3) = a3, ν1(i4) = a4 and ν1(i6) = a0. Go to step 1.
Step 1
As (a4, a4) ∈ SB3 , s3(1) = (a5, a5). s13(1) = a5 6= λ1(i3) = a3 and s13(1) /∈ A1U . Go to step
1.1.
Step 1.1
i3 → (a5, a5)→ i5 and i5 is placed at the bottom of g1. As i3 → (a5, a5), both (a5, a3) and
(a3, a5) are blocked and s5(1) = (a5, a5) = λ(i5). Go to step 1.1.1.
Step 1.1.1
(a5, a5) is sorted into S
B
3 and i5 is removed from g
1. Go to step 1.
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Step 1
As (a5, a5) ∈ SB3 , s3(1) = (a5, a4). a5 6= λ1(i3) = a3 and a5 /∈ A1U . Go to step 1.1.
Step 1.1
i3 → (a5, a4) → i5 and i5 is placed at the bottom of g1. s5(1) = (a3, a5), as (a5, a3) is
blocked by i3. (a3, a5) 6= λ(i5) and a3 = ν1(i3). Go to step 1.1.2.a.
Step 1.1.2.a
A cycle c11 is formed. ν1 is modified such that ν1(i3) = a5 and ν1(i5) = a3 and g
2
1 = (i3) is
generated. ν2 is modified such ν2(i5) = a3 and ν2(i3) = a5. Go to step 2.
Step 2
s3(1) = (a5, a4) and a4 ∈ AtU . Go to step 2.1.4.b.
Step 2.1.4.b
A cycle c21 is formed. ν2 is modified such that ν2(i3) = a4 and such that a5 ∈ A2U . Go to
step 2.1.5.
Step 2.1.5
#g2 = 1 < #g1 = 2. Go to step 2.1.5.a.
Step 2.1.5.a
g22 = ({g1 \ g2}(1)) = (i5) is generated. Go to step 2.
Step 2
s5(1) = (a3, a5) and a5 ∈ A2U . Go to step 2.1.4.b
Step 2.1.4.b
A cycle c22 is formed. ν2 is modified such that ν2(i5) = a5 and such that a3 ∈ A2U . Go to
step 2.1.5.
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Step 2.1.5
#g2 = #g1 = 2. Go to step 2.1.5.b.
Step 2.1.5.b
T = 2. Go to step T.2.
Step T.2
µ is modified such that µ(i3) = (a5, a4) and µ(i5) = (a3, a5). The remaining a ∈ AtA are
removed such that AtA = ∅ for t = 1, 2 and {i3, i5} are removed from f . Go to step 0.
At this point, f = (i6), A
1
U = a6 and A
2
U = a3. It is easy to see that i6 will be assigned
(a6, a3), yielding the final matching plan µ, where µ(i1) = (a4, a2), µ(i2) = (a2, a1),
µ(i3) = (a5, a4), µ(i4) = (a1, a6), µ(i5) = (a3, a5) and µ(i6) = (a6, a3). Note that the
algorithm locates three cycle sets C ∈ Cµ.
4 Properties
As mentioned in the introduction, mechanisms are often evaluated by examining which
properties they satisfy. This section will investigate whether the ϕ mechanism satisfies
individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, non-bossiness and strategy-proofness. Proposition
1 states that the ϕ mechanism is individually rational, Proposition 2 states that it is Pareto
efficient and Proposition 3 states that it is non-bossy. Furthermore, Proposition 4 states
that the ϕ mechanism is not strategy proof and Proposition 5 presents the conditions under
which it is manipulable.
To examine the properties of the ϕ mechanism, some additional concepts are helpful.
Recall the definition of Bj and amend it by adding the underlined ∪i, such that
B′j ≡ {b ∈ I ∪ {at ∈ At | t ∈ [1, T ]} | b ∈ B′j−1 ∪ {Kj \KB′j−1∪i}(1)}, (27)
where B′0 = ∅ and consequently KB′0 = ∅. Let the agent i’s consumption set be defined by
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the ordered set
Xi ≡ {x ∈ C ∈
{ { {Kj \KB′j−1}(1), {Kj \KB′j−1}(2), . . . , {Kj \KB′j−1}(kj) |
({Kj \KB′j−1}(kj + 1) = {Kj \KB′j−1∪i}(1)) ∧
(i1 ≡ f(1)) ∧ (ij≥2 ≡ (ij ∈ I) /∈ B′j−1: ∀(i′ ∈ I) /∈ B′j−1 ijfi′) } | ijfi } ∪
{ {Ki \KB′j}(1), {Ki \KB′j}(2), . . . , {Ki \KB′j}(k) |
(∀(i′ ∈ I) /∈ B′j ifi′) ∧ (i→ λ(i) in {Ki \KB′j}(k)) }
| i→ x in C}. (28)
Any consumption path (x 6= λ(i)) ∈ Xi can be rejected by reporting preferences under
which x is not acceptable. Xi is ordered such that x ∈ {Kj \KB′j−1}(k) is of higher order
than x′ ∈ {K ′j \ KB′j′−1}(k′) if and only if j < j′ or (j = j′) ∧ (k < k′). To phrase it
differently, the consumption path x ∈ Xi is of higher order than x′ ∈ Xi under Xi if
there exists some C ∈ {Cj | (i ∈ Cj) ∧ (i → x)} that the algorithm processes before
all C ∈ {Cj | (i ∈ Cj) ∧ (i → x′)}. Hence, Xi(j) is the jth consumption path that
i has the opportunity of rejecting. It is always true that ϕi(P, f) = Xi(1). Xi will be
deconstructed and explained in the proof of Lemma 1, which states that Xi defines the full
set of consumption paths attainable by i using some strategy Si ∈ Ω.
Lemma 1. ∀i ∈ I,∀(P, f) ∈∏Ni=1 Ω× F Xi = {ϕi({Si, PI\i}, f) | Si ∈ Ω}.
Proof. For this proof, the reader will have to refer to section 3.3 to confirm the order in
which cycle sets are processed by the algorithm. Consider some priority structure f ∈ F
and some agent i ∈ I who reports some preference relation P ′i ∈ Ω such that ∀x ∈
X λ(i)R′ix and P
′
i 6= Pi, where Pi is agent i’s true preference relation and R′i denotes
weak preference under P ′i . The algorithm will start by processing the cycle set Kf(1)(1).
If i ∈ Kf(1)(1), then Kf(1)(1) will be blocked by i and the algorithm will continue by
processing Kf(1)(2), Kf(1)(3) and so on until i /∈ Kf(1)(k+1), as defined in the definition of
Xi. While it does not invalidate this proof, it should be noted that the algorithm technically
does not process cycle sets one by one. Rather, it processes subsets of Kf(1) such that if
i = g1(j) at some step of the algorithm and agent g1(j−1) is assigned the same consumption
path under Kf(1)(1), Kf(1)(2) . . . Kf(1)(k), then all cycle sets in {Kf(1)(1), . . . , Kf(1)(k)} are
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skipped simultaneously if blocked by i. The algorithm will thus process all elements in
{K1(1), K1(2), . . . , K1(k) | K1(k + 1) = {K1 \Ki}(1) ∧ i1 ≡ f(1) 6= i}. (29)
If K1(1) = {K1 \ Ki}(1), then the above set is empty. At this point, the algorithm will
assign all agents in {K1 \Ki}(1) the consumption paths they point to. All such agents are
removed from the process along with the objects at ∈ At they point to, thereby blocking
all cycle sets involving some agent or object in
B′1 ≡ {b ∈ I ∪ {at ∈ At | t ∈ [1, T ]} | b ∈ {K1 \Ki}(1)}}. (30)
As all agents in {K1 \Ki}(1) have been removed from the process, the algorithm continues
by processing {K2 \KB′1}(1). As this cycle is also blocked by agent i, the algorithm will
continue by processing {K2\KB′1}(2) and so on until the first cycle set in K2\KB′1 that does
not involve agent i, {K2\KB′1∪i}(1), is reached. At this point, all agents in {K2\KB′1∪i}(1)
are assigned the consumption paths they point to and are removed from the process along
with the objects at ∈ At they point to, thereby blocking all cycle sets involving some agent
or object in
B′2 ≡ {b ∈ I ∪ {at ∈ At | t ∈ [1, T ]} | b ∈ B′1 ∪ {K2 \KB′1∪i}(1)}. (31)
Generally, this process continues for the sets K3, K4 and so on. The algorithm has thus
been shown to process all elements in
{ {Kj \KB′j−1}(1), {Kj \KB′j−1}(2), . . . , {Kj \KB′j−1}(kj) |
({Kj \KB′j−1}(kj + 1) = {Kj \KB′j−1∪i}(1)) ∧
(i1 ≡ f(1)) ∧ (ij≥2 ≡ (ij ∈ I) /∈ B′j−1: ∀(i′ ∈ I) /∈ B′j−1 ijfi′) } | ijfi }. (32)
When the algorithm arrives at a point when the condition ijfi no longer holds, then
∀i′ /∈ B′j−1 ifi′. In other words, agent i is the agent with highest priority under f who is still
in the process. The algorithm then proceeds by processing {Ki\KBj−1}(1), {Ki\KBj−1}(2)
and so on, until it reaches some cycle set in Ki \KBj−1 in which i → λ(i). Note that the
cycle set involving only agent i and his or her endowment is always a member of Ki \KBj−1
as i /∈ Bj−1 and if λt(i) ∈ Bj−1 for any t ∈ [1, T ], agent i would also be a member of Bj−1.
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The endowment λ(i) can never be rejected by agent i, and i is then finally assigned λ(i).
This covers all elements in
{ {Ki \KB′j}(1), {Ki \KB′j}(2), . . . , {Ki \KB′j}(k) |
∀(i′ ∈ I) /∈ B′j ifi′ ∧ (i→ λ(i) in {Ki \KB′j}(k)) }. (33)
It has thus been shown that if some agent i ∈ I blocks all cycles he or she is able to, the
algorithm will process all elements in Xi. Xi is then defined as the set of consumption
paths agent i points to in each cycle set in the union of the sets (32) and (33). Consider
an arbitrary element in Xi, Xi(j) 6= λ(i), and a strategy P ′′i ∈ Ω, where
∀x′ ∈ X \Xi(j) Xi(j)P ′′i λ(i)R′′i x′. (34)
Under this strategy, agent i will be assigned Xi(j). Hence,
∀j ≤ #Xi ∃Si ∈ Ω: ϕi({Si, PI\i}, f) = Xi(j). (35)
Next, consider an arbitrary subset X ′i ⊆ {Xi \ λ(i)} and a strategy P ′′i ∈ Ω, where
∀x′ ∈ X ′i,∀x ∈ X \X ′i x′P ′′i λ(i)R′′i x. (36)
Then,
X ′i 6= ∅ =⇒ ϕi({P ′′i , PI\i}, f) = X ′i(1) (37)
and
X ′i = ∅ =⇒ ϕi({P ′′i , PI\i}, f) = λ(i). (38)
This covers the entire strategy space Ω. Consequently,
∀Si ∈ Ω ϕi({Si, PI\i}, f) ∈ Xi. (39)
Statements (35) and (39) imply Lemma 1.
No x /∈ Xi is attainable using any strategy Si ∈ Ω, and all x ∈ Xi are attainable
using some strategy Si ∈ Ω. Note that whenever i = f(1), (32) is an empty set. While
this implies that Xf(1) can be defined by a shorter expression it does not imply a smaller
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consumption set for agent f(1). As there are no cycle sets that are blocked by some agent
of higher priority, agent f(1)’s consumption set is given by all consumption paths he or
she points to under any C ∈ CIR.
4.1 Positive results
Definition 2. A matching plan µ ∈ M is individually rational if and only if µ(i) is
acceptable to i, for all i ∈ I.
Define MIR ⊆M as the set of all individually rational matching plans.
Definition 3. A direct mechanism Γ is individually rational if and only if
∀(S, f) ∈
N∏
i=1
Ω× F Γ(S, f) ∈MIR. (40)
In other words, a mechanism is individually rational if it always selects individually
rational matching plans. Individual rationality is considered a desirable property as it
ensures that no agent is ever made worse off by the mechanism. If the mechanism is
individually rational, there is no incentive for any agent not to participate in the economy.
Proposition 1. The ϕ mechanism is individually rational.
Proof. Trivial. Agents are only assigned consumption paths that they point to. By con-
struction, agents only point to acceptable consumption paths.
Definition 4. A matching plan µ is Pareto efficient if and only if
@µ′ ∈M : µ′Riµ ∀i ∈ I and µ′Piµ for some i ∈ I. (41)
That is, a matching plan is Pareto efficient if no agent can be made better off without
making some agent worse off.
Definition 5. A direct mechanism Γ is Pareto efficient if the matching plan Γ(P, f) is
Pareto efficient for all (P, f) ∈∏Ni=1 Ω× F .
Pareto efficiency is clearly considered a desirable property by mechanism designers
interested in the utility of the agents.
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Proposition 2. The mechanism ϕ is Pareto efficient.
Proof. Consider some arbitrary (P, f) ∈ ∏Ni=1 Ω × F and a new ordered set h, con-
taining all agents in I. h is partitioned into h1, h2, . . . h#Cµ , where #C
µ is the num-
ber of cycle sets in Cµ. h1 is equivalent to g
1 at step T.2, when the first C ∈ Cµ
forms in the algorithm. hj is equivalent to g
1 at step T.2, when the j’th C ∈ Cµ
forms in the algorithm. The elements in h are ordered by subindex first, such that h =
{h1(1), h1(2), . . . h1(#h1), h2(1), h2(2), . . . h#Cµ(#h#Cµ)}. Under ϕ(P, f), agent h(1) ∈ I
is assigned his or her most preferred consumption path x ∈ X from {x | x ∈ µ ∈ MIR}.
Denote this x by x1. Then for some µ
′ ∈M ,
µ′Ph(1)ϕ(P, f) =⇒ µ′ /∈MIR ⇐⇒ ∃i ∈ I: λPiµ′. (42)
By transitivity and Proposition 1,
∃i ∈ I: λPiµ′ =⇒ ∃i ∈ I: ϕ(P, f)Piµ′. (43)
Hence,
µ′Ph(1)ϕ(P, f) =⇒ ∃i ∈ I: ϕ(P, f)Piµ′ (44)
and
@µ′Ph(1)ϕ(P, f): µ′Riϕ(P, f) ∀i ∈ I. (45)
Agent h(1) can only be made better off by making some other agent worse off.
Under ϕ(P, f), agent h(2) is assigned his or her most preferred consumption path
from
{x | x ∈ µ ∈MIR ∧ µ(h(1)) = x1}. (46)
Denote this x by x2. Then for some µ
′ ∈M ,
µ′Ph(2)ϕ(f, P ) =⇒ (µ′ /∈MIR ∨ µ′(h(1)) 6= x1). (47)
By statements (42) and (43),
µ′ /∈MIR =⇒ ∃i ∈ I : ϕ(f, P )Piµ′. (48)
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Since all preference relations over X are strict,
µ′(h(1)) 6= x1 =⇒ (µ′Ph(1)ϕ(P, f) ∨ ϕ(P, f)Ph(1)µ′). (49)
By statement (44),
µ′Ph(1)ϕ(P, f) =⇒ ∃i ∈ I : ϕ(f, P )Piµ′. (50)
As h(1) ∈ I,
ϕ(P, f)Ph(1)µ
′ =⇒ ∃i ∈ I : ϕ(f, P )Piµ′. (51)
By statements (47) through (51),
µ′Ph(2)ϕ(f, P ) =⇒ ∃i ∈ I : ϕ(f, P )Piµ′ (52)
and
@µ′Ph(2)ϕ(f, P ) : µ′Riϕ(f, P ) ∀i ∈ I. (53)
Agent h(2) can only be made better off by making some other agent worse off.
Consider some arbitrary j > 2. Agent h(j) is assigned his or her most preferred
consumption path from
{x | (x ∈ µ ∈MIR) ∧ (∀i ∈ [1, j − 1] µ(h(i)) = xi)}. (54)
Denote this consumption path by xj. Note that this recursively defines xi for i > 2 as well.
Then for some µ′ ∈M ,
µ′Ph(j)ϕ(P, f) =⇒ (µ′ /∈MIR ∨ ∃i < j: µ′(h(i)) 6= xi). (55)
As all preference relations on X are strict,
∃i < j : µ′(h(i)) 6= xi =⇒ (µ′Ph(i)ϕ(P, f) ∨ ϕ(P, f)Ph(i)µ′). (56)
By the general version of statement (51):
ϕ(P, f)Ph(i)µ
′ =⇒ ∃i′ ∈ I : ϕ(P, f)Pi′µ′ (57)
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and by statement (48),
(µ′ /∈MIR ∨ ϕ(P, f)Ph(i)µ′) =⇒ ∃i′ ∈ I : ϕ(P, f)Pi′µ′. (58)
The only outcome not yet addressed is µ′Ph(i)ϕ(P, f), for which statement (55) can be
reapplied. By statements (55), (56) and (58),
µ′Ph(j)ϕ(P, f) =⇒ ( (∃i ∈ I : ϕ(P, f)Piµ′) ∨ (µ′Ph(j′)ϕ(P, f) for some j′ < j) ). (59)
Statement (59) can be reapplied until (∃i ∈ I: ϕ(P, f)Piµ′) ∨ (j′ = 1) is true. If j′ = 1,
then statement (44) is applicable. Thus, by statements (44) and (59),
∀j ∈ I,∀f ∈ F : µ′Ph(j)ϕ(P, f) =⇒ ∃i′ ∈ I : ϕ(P, f)Pi′µ′. (60)
No agent can be made better off without making some other agent worse off. Hence, for
any (P, f) ∈∏Ni=1 Ω× F ,
@µ′ ∈M : µ′Riϕ(P, f) ∀i ∈ I and µ′Piϕ(P, f) for some i ∈ I. (61)
Definition 6. A mechanism Γ is non-bossy if and only if
∀Si ∈ Ω,∀(P, f) ∈
N∏
i=1
Ω× F Γi({Si, PI\i}, f) = Γi(P, f) =⇒ Γ({Si, PI\i}, f) = Γ(P, f).
(62)
In other words, a mechanism is non-bossy if no agent can affect any other agent’s
assignment without affecting his or her own assignment as well. The concept of non-
bossiness is due to Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981).
Proposition 3. The ϕ mechanism is non-bossy.
Proof. Consider some i ∈ I, (P, f) ∈∏Ni=1 Ω×F and some Cµ, defining µ = ϕ(P, f) ∈MIR.
By definition, ϕi′(P, f) ∈ Cj for some Cj ∈ Cµ for each i′ ∈ I. Under Cµ, ∀i′ ∈ I i′ → µ(i′).
As f is given, C is fully determined by which x ∈ X each i′ ∈ C points to. If i ∈ C ∈ Cµ,
there are three alternatives. Either #{i′ ∈ I | i′ ∈ C} = 1, (#{i′ ∈ I | i′ ∈ C} ≥
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2) ∧ (∀(i′ 6= i) ∈ C ifi′) or (#{i ∈ I | i ∈ C} ≥ 2) ∧ (∃i′ ∈ C: i′fi). Recall that Ki is
ordered such that
{x ∈ {Ki \KBj}(k) | i→ x}Pi{x′ ∈ {Ki \KBj}(k′) | i→ x′} =⇒ k < k′, (63)
where both sets only have one element each.
Case 1.
If (#{i′ ∈ I | i′ ∈ C} = 1) ∨ (#{i′ ∈ I | i′ ∈ C} ≥ 2 ∧ ∀i′ ∈ C ifi′) under Cµ, then
C = {Ki \KBj}(1) ∈ Cµ, where ∀i′ /∈ Bj ifi′ and ∀i′ ∈ Bj i′fi. Thus,
ϕi(P, f) = {x ∈ {Ki \KBj}(1) | ((i′ 6= i) /∈ Bj ⇐⇒ ifi′) ∧ (i→ x)}
=⇒ ∀Si ∈ {Si ∈ Ω | ϕi({Si, PI\i}, f) = ϕi(P, f)}
ϕi({Si, PI\i}, f) = {x ∈ {Ki \KBj}(1) | ((i′ 6= i) /∈ Bj ⇐⇒ ifi′) ∧ (i→ x)}
=⇒ ∀Si ∈ {Si ∈ Ω | ϕi({Si, PI\i}, f) = ϕi(P, f)} i→ µ(i) ∈ {Ki \KBj}(1) ∈ Cµ
=⇒ ∀Si ∈ {Si ∈ Ω | ϕi({Si, PI\i}, f) = ϕi(P, f)} i ∈ C ∈ Cµ
=⇒ ∀Si ∈ {Si ∈ Ω | ϕi({Si, PI\i}, f) = ϕi(P, f)},∀i′ ∈ I i′ ∈ Cj, for some Cj ∈ Cµ.
(64)
The second implication follows from the fact that all agents are assigned the consumption
paths they point to in Cµ. The third implication follows from the fact that for a given
f ∈ F , each C is defined by which x ∈ X each i ∈ C points to. The fourth implication
follows from the fact that if no agent changes which consumption path he or she points to,
the same cycle sets in Cµ will form. By the definition of Cµ and the fact that if all agents
participate in some cycle set in Cµ under S ∈∏Ni=1 Ω, then ϕ(S, f) = µ,
∀Si ∈ Ω ( (ϕi({Si, PI\i}, f) = ϕi(P, f)) =⇒ (ϕ({Si, PI\i}, f) = µ = ϕ(P, f)) ). (65)
This proves non-bossiness for case 1.
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Case 2.
If (#{i′ ∈ I | i′ ∈ C} ≥ 2) ∧ (∃i′ ∈ C: i′fi) under Cµ, then i participates in the cycle set
{C = {Kj \KBj−1}(1) ∈ Cµ | (j ≥ 1) ∧ (i ∈ C)} (66)
whenever it exists. If it does not exist, then #{i ∈ I | i ∈ C} ≥ 2 ∧ ∃i′ ∈ C: i′fi is a
false statement and case 1 applies. Note that
{C = {Kj \KBj−1}(1) ∈ Cµ | (j ≥ 1) ∧ (i ∈ C)} 6= ∅ =⇒
{C = {Kj′ \KBj′−1}(1) ∈ Cµ | (j′ > j) ∧ (i ∈ C)} = ∅, (67)
as i ∈ Bj′−1. Whenever a cycle set C ∈ Cµ as defined by statement (66) forms under
ϕ(P, f), it also forms under ϕ({P ′i , PI\i}, f) if and only if µ(i)P ′iλ(i).
∀Si ∈ {P ′i ∈ Ω | µ(i)P ′iλ(i)} i ∈ C ∈ Cµ =⇒ ϕ({Si, PI\i}, f) = µ = ϕ(P, f). (68)
By Proposition 1,
∀Si ∈ {P ′i ∈ Ω | λ(i)P ′iµ(i)} ϕi({Si, PI\i}, f) 6= µ(i)
=⇒ ϕ({Si, PI\i}, f) 6= µ = ϕ(P, f). (69)
This follows from the fact that no cycle sets that are reported as acceptable to an agent
are rejected. Note that the case where µ(i)R′iλ(i) ∧ λ(i)Riµ(i) is case 1. Statements (68)
and (69) thus cover all Si ∈ Ω in case 2. Therefore,
∀Si ∈ {Si ∈ Ω | ϕi({Si, PI\i}, f) = ϕi(P, f)} i ∈ C ∈ Cµ, (70)
where C is defined by (66). From this, it follows that
∀Si ∈ {Si ∈ Ω | ϕi({Si, PI\i}, f) = ϕi(P, f)},∀i′ ∈ I i′ ∈ Cj, for some Cj ∈ Cµ
=⇒ ∀Si ∈ Ω ( ϕi({Si, PI\i}, f) = ϕi(P, f) =⇒ ϕ({Si, PI\i}, f) = µ = ϕ(P, f) ). (71)
This proves non-bossiness for case 2. Statements (65) and (71) yield the desired result.
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The intuition is simple. If agent i participates in some C ∈ Cµ, where ϕ(P, f) = µ,
then i can only prevent the mechanism from selecting µ by preventing C from forming. If
agent i is not the agent with highest priority in C, C will form whenever the consumption
path i points to in C is preferred to λ(i). Agent i can thus only block it by reporting
that the consumption path he would be assigned under C is not acceptable, in which case
i would be assigned some other consumption path. If agent i is the agent with highest
priority in C, C only forms when it is preferred by i to all C ′ ∈ CIR that involve no agents
¬i ∈ I or objects at ∈ At participating in any cycle set that has already formed. C can
thus only be blocked by i by reporting that some C ′ ∈ CIR that involves no agent or
object participating in any cycle that has already formed is preferred to C. Recall that
(C ∈ Cµ)Pi(C ′ ∈ Cµ′) ⇐⇒ µ(i)Piµ′(i), implying that i can only block C by being
assigned some x 6= µ(i). Thus, there is no way for i to affect any other agent’s assignment
and still retain his or her own assignment.
4.2 Negative results
Definition 7. A mechanism Γ is manipulable by a coalition I ′ ⊂ I at some (P, f) ∈∏N
i=1 Ω× F if and only if
∃S ∈
N∏
i=1
Ω: Γ(f, {SI′ , PII′})PiΓ(f, P ) ∀i ∈ I ′. (72)
In other words, a mechanism is manipulable whenever it is possible for some coalition
of agents to benefit from misrepresenting their preferences. Such a coalition may consist
of a single agent. This definition is an adaptation of the definition used by Andersson and
Svensson (2008).
Definition 8. A mechanism is (coalitionally) strategy-proof if and only if it is not manip-
ulable by any (coalition I ′ ⊂ I) agent i ∈ I at any (P, f) ∈∏Ni=1 Ω× F .
Proposition 4. The mechanism ϕ is not strategy-proof.
Proof. Consider an allocation problem 〈T, I, A, P, λ〉, where T = 2, I = {i1, i2}, A =
{a1, a2}, λ(1) = (a1, a1), λ(2) = (a2, a2) and P is given by
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P1 P2
(a2, a2) (a2, a1)
(a2, a1) (a1, a1)
(a1, a2) (a1, a2)
(a1, a1) (a2, a2)
Furthermore, let f = (i1, i2). This yields ϕ1(P, f) = (a2, a2) and ϕ2(P, f) = (a1, a1).
Next, consider strategy S2,
S2
(a2, a1)
(a2, a2)
(a1, a1)
(a1, a2)
and note that ϕ1({P1, S2}, f) = (a1, a2) and ϕ2({P1, S2}, f) = (a2, a1). Consequently,
ϕ2({P1, S2}, f)P2ϕ(P, f) and the mechanism is not strategy-proof.
Corollary 1. The mechanism is not coalitionally strategy-proof.
Proof. An agent is a coalition.
Pareto optimality is conditional on the assumption that all agents report their true
preferences. If there are incentives for agents not to report their true preferences, the
mechanism does not necessarily select a Pareto efficient matching plan. This makes ma-
nipulability a problematic issue. It is therefore relevant to examine precisely why and
when the ϕ mechanism is vulnerable to manipulation. To illustrate the problem, consider
an allocation problem 〈T, I, A, P, λ〉, where T = 2, I = {i1, i2}, A = {a1, a2}, λ(i1) = a1,
λ(i2) = a2 and P is given by
P1 P2
(a2, a2) (a2, a1)
(a2, a1) (a1, a2)
(a1, a2) (a1, a1)
(a1, a1) (a2, a2)
Furthermore, let f = (i1, i2). In this problem, ϕ1(P, f) = (a2, a2) and ϕ2(P, f) = (a1, a1).
A cycle set C is formed such that agent i1 is assigned his or her most preferred consumption
path, while agent i2 is assigned his or her third most preferred consumption path. Agent
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i2 can improve his or her assignment by blocking C and C can be blocked by reporting
that (a1, a1) is not acceptable, e.g. by reporting
S2
(a2, a1)
(a1, a2)
(a2, a2)
(a1, a1)
A cycle set C ′ would form such that ϕ1({P1, S2}, f) = (a2, a1) and ϕ2({P1, S2}, f) =
(a1, a2). Just like above, C
′ can be blocked by agent i2 by reporting some S ′2 under which
neither (a1, a1) nor (a1, a2) is acceptable. This would produce a new cycle set, where
ϕ1({P1, S ′2}, f) = (a1, a2) and ϕ2({P1, S ′2}, f) = (a2, a1). Agent i1 is then assigned his or
her third most preferred consumption path, while agent i2 is assigned his or her most pre-
ferred consumption path. In this manner, an agent can always choose for the other agent
among that agent’s acceptable consumption paths when N = 2.
Whenever N > 2, the assignment of the first agent cannot be selected as freely by the
second agent. If the second agent blocks a number of cycle sets, a cycle set might form, in
which the first agent participates but the second agent does not. For example, consider an
allocation problem 〈T, I, A, P, λ〉, where T = 2, I = {i1, i2, i3}, A = {a1, a2, a3}, λ(i) = ai
for i = 1, 2, 3 and P is given by
P1 P2 P3
(a3, a3) (a2, a1) (a2, a2)
(a1, a2) (a1, a1) (a1, a1)
. . . . . . . . .
Furthermore, let f = (i1, i2). In this problem, ϕ1(P, f) = (a3, a3), ϕ2(P, f) = (a1, a1) and
ϕ3(P, f) = (a2, a2). There exists a cycle set C ∈ CIR in which i2 would be assigned (a2, a1)
and i1 would be assigned (a1, a2). Agent i2 would clearly prefer this consumption path.
However, suppose i2 blocks the cycle set formed under the strategy profile P by reporting
S2
(a2, a1)
(a2, a2)
. . .
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Under S = {PI\i2 , S2}, a new cycle set is formed involving only agents i1 and i3, such that
ϕ1(S, f) = (a3, a3), ϕ2(S, f) = (a2, a2) and ϕ3(S, f) = (a1, a1). The consumption path
(a2, a1) is thus unattainable by i2. That is, (a2, a1) /∈ X2. This is true irrespective of the
existence of an individually rational cycle set in which i2 is assigned (a2, a1). Proposition
5 defines precisely when the ϕ mechanism is not manipulable for the general case.
Proposition 5. The mechanism ϕ is not manipulable by any agent i ∈ I at (P, f) ∈∏N
i=1 Ω× F if and only if
∀i ∈ I,∀j ≤ #Xi Xi(1)RiXi(j). (73)
Proof.
∃i ∈ I: ¬(Xi(1)RiXi(j)) for some j ≤ #Xi =⇒ ∃i ∈ I: Xi(j)PiXi(1) for some j ≤ #Xi
=⇒ ∃Si ∈ Ω: ϕ({Si, PI\i}, f)Piϕ(P, f). (74)
The first implication follows from the definition of weak preference. The second implication
follows from Lemma 1 and from the fact that ϕi(P, f) = Xi(1). Furthermore,
∃i ∈ I: ϕ({Si, PI\i}, f)Piϕ(P, f) for some Si ∈ Ω =⇒ ∃j ≤ #Xi: Xi(j)PiXi(1)
=⇒ ∃j ≤ #Xi: ¬(Xi(1)RiXi(j)). (75)
The first implication follows from Lemma 1 and from the fact that ϕ(P, f) = Xi(1). The
second implication follows from the definition of weak preference. By statements (74) and
(75),
∀i ∈ I @Si ∈ Ω: ϕ({Si, PI\i}, f)Piϕ(P, f) ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ I,∀j ≤ #Xi Xi(1)RiXi(j). (76)
5 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this paper was to present a futures mechanism that solves intertempo-
ral allocation problems, while satisfying individual rationality, Pareto efficiency and non-
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bossiness. The ϕ futures mechanism was presented, and it was proven to satisfy individual
rationality, Pareto efficiency and non-bossiness. Furthermore, it was proven that the ϕ
mechanism does not satisfy strategy-proofness and the conditions under which the mech-
anism is manipulable were presented and proven. The model could be extended by intro-
ducing dynamics in the form of entry and exit of agents, as in Bloch and Cantala (2011)
and Kurino (2009, 2013), or in the form of production and destruction of objects. It could,
however, not be extended by introducing dynamics in preferences, as in Abdulkadiroglu
and Loertscher (2007), since this would make futures mechanisms inapplicable. The ϕ
mechanism is presented in a general form and custom tailoring for various real world appli-
cations, such as house and office space allocation problems, is possible. Furthermore, the
mechanism could be made more general by allowing objects to be assigned to more than
one agent per period. This might not make it applicable for school choice problems, but it
could make it applicable for e.g. course bidding problems, as studied in a one-period setting
by So¨nmez and U¨nver (2010). Another extension worth considering is to allow the priority
structure to differ for different objects or groups of objects, as in Ergin (2002). Finally, it
would be possible to devote further studies to providing a complete characterization of the
ϕ mechanism.
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